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In the years subsequent to the last survey,' the Florida Legislature
has begun yearly sessions and has produced a number of statutory
changes which affect corporations.2
1. CORPORATE FORMATION
Possibly the most significant change in Florida corporate law was
the reduction in the number of persons required for incorporation. Under
the prior incorporation statute,3 three or more persons were required.
Under the new law,4 a corporation may be organized by one or more
natural persons.' The passage of this bill, first introduced in 1967,0 was
long overdue.
In accordance with this change, the legislature revised the remainder
of Florida Statutes chapter 608 (1969) .7 However, an apparent over-
sight, not corrected in the 1970 revision, appears in Florida Statutes
section 608.13(6) (Supp. 1970) which requires that the number of di-
rectors, managers, or trustees shall never be less than three. A recently
enacted law corrected this oversight by completely deleting any numeri-
cal requirement.
The second major change occurred in the revision of Florida Stat-
utes section 608.03(2)(b) (1969). Previously, under this section, an
attorney was required to insert pages of stylized language which consti-
tuted a statement of the business that the corporation was empowered
to transact. Under the new statute,9 while the attorney may still use
stylized language, he does not have to. Rather, "a statement that the cor-
poration may engage in any activity or business permitted under the laws
of the United States and of this state . . .,"0 will suffice to authorize any
and all lawful business. This obviates the former necessity of employing
archaic language and will greatly aid the attorney in preparing the pro-
posed corporation's articles of incorporation.
1. Sowards, Mofsky and Dresnick, Florida Securities Regulation and Corporate Law,
1967-1969 Survey of Florida Law, 24 U. MsAsn L. REv. 504 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, §§ 633-34, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 608.59,
608.67 (1969), which changed certain penalties for corporate improprieties.
3. FLA. STAT. § 608.03(1) (a) (1969).
4. FLA. STAT. § 608.03(1) (a) (Supp. 1970).
5. Due to the nature and purpose of a corporation, that is, limited liability, there
would appear to be little reason to restrict incorporators to natural persons in the author's
opinion.
6. S.B. 1499, 1967 Sess., Fla. Legislature.
7. This section deals with the statutory regulation of corporations and closely-held
corporations.
8. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-355, § 159.
9. FLA. STAT. § 608.03(2)(b) (Supp. 1970).
10. Id.
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2. CORPORATE NAME
Florida Statutes section 608.031 (Supp. 1970), which deals with the
reservation of a proposed corporate name, was also the subject of ex-
tensive rewriting. A corporation, foreign or domestic, or a person intend-
ing to organize either type of corporation may now reserve a name for a
period of 120 days upon the payment of a filing fee not to exceed five
dollars by applying to the Department of State, pursuant to the depart-
ment's rules and regulations. Under the prior law," only incorporators
could reserve a name, and then for only a period of 15 days with only
one 15 day renewal period available.' 2
3. CORPORATE EXISTENCE
Subject to a 90 day limit, the date of corporate existence may be
specified in the articles of incorporation.' a The incorporators may set a
day certain for the beginning of corporate existence, and this provision
should make it possible for corporate planners to avoid the situation of
inadvertently going into business in advance of official incorporation
with a resultant loss of limited liability protection.' 4 This date may be at
the time of subscription and acknowledgement, provided that the articles
of incorporation are filed within five days, are approved, and all fees and
taxes are paid.' 5 If the date is not specified in the articles of incorporation,
existence will begin as provided under the statute prior to its amend-
ment. 8 The effect of the amendment was primarily the transfer of
Florida Statutes section 608.041(1) (1969) 1" to Florida Statutes section
608.04 (Supp. 1970).
4. CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
A new section' 8 was added to Florida Statutes chapter 608 (1969),
the Florida corporation code, which provides that a corporation may inte-
grate all previous amendments to its certificate of incorporation into a
single instrument by adoption of the restated certificate by the board of
directors. The new certificate, of course, must satisfy all the proper
statutory formalities," though it may omit the provisions of the original
11. FLA. STAT. § 608.031 (1969).
12. See section I, B, 2, infra for applicable cases.
13. FLA. STAT. § 608.04 (Supp. 1970).
14. Id.
15. See Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-359, amending FLA. STAT. § 608.05 (1969). Upon the
filing of the articles of incorporation, the corporate privilege tax must be paid. See section
I, K, infra.
16. FLA. STAT. § 608.041(1) (1969) (namely after approval by the Department of State).
17. General housekeeping changes have been made in this section which have no effect
on the substantive law.
18. FLA. STAT. § 608.061 (Supp. 1970).
19. FLA. STAT. § 608.03 (Supp. 1970) (corporate name, amount of stock, type of
business, etc.).
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certificate of incorporation which named the incorporator or incorpora-
tors, the initial board of directors, and the original subscribers for
shares. 0
Three changes have been made in the requirements for articles of
incorporation. First, the legislature has clarified Florida Statutes section
608.03 (2) (f) (Supp. 1970) to require that only "the initial street address
in this state of the principal office of the proposed corporation" be in-
cluded in the articles of incorporation. Second, if the corporation will not
have directors pursuant to Florida Statutes section 608.72 (1969), this
fact must be stated in the articles.2 ' Finally, the articles must only be
subscribed to by one or more natural persons.22
5. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The executive committee's purpose is to perform certain functions,
primarily management related, delegated to it by the board of directors.
The board of directors may elect an alternate member to the committee
to act in the place of an absentee or member disqualified from voting. In
the alternative, if the by laws so provide, the members of the committee
itself, regardless of whether or not a quorum has been constituted, may
unanimously appoint a member of the board of directors to replace an
absent or disqualified member of the committee.2"
6. STOCKHOLDER'S MEETING
The board of directors, unless prohibited by the certificate of incor-
poration or by the by laws, may fix without notice a date not more than
sixty days 4 before the date of the stockholder's meeting as the record
date of "which the stockholders of record who have the right to and are
entitled to notice of and to vote at such meeting ... shall be deter-
mined."25 The prior statute required that notice be published in a news-
paper where the principal place of business of the corporation was
located at least five days before the date was fixed.
The deletion of the notice requirement will probably have a tre-
mendous impact upon "proxy fights," stock acquisitions, and other con-
tests for control of a corporation under state law. This is because under
the present statute, if the annual meeting is forthcoming and the directors
are aware of a sudden activity in their corporation's stock, they may fix
a record date without notice. The deletion of the notice requirement en-
20. FLA. STAT. § 608.061 (Supp. 1970).
21. FiA. STAT. § 608.03(2) (g) (Supp. 1970). Under the prior statute, three directors
were required. See also Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-355, § 158, which amends the statute to make
it applicable to the management of a closely-held corporation by stockholders.
22. FLA. STAT. § 608.03(4) (Supp. 1970). Under the prior statute, three natural per-
sons were required.
23. FLA. STAT. § 608.09(3) (Supp. 1970).
24. Formerly forty days. FLA. STAT. § 608.10(2) (1969).
25. FLA. STAT. § 608.10(2) (Supp. 1970).
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ables the directors to fix a date prior to the purchase of stock by their
opposition. Therefore, the opposition would not be shareholders of record
on the record date declared and thus, would be ineligible to vote those
shares purchased after the record date unless they receive a proxy
from the prior owners who are listed as the stockholders of record. To
avoid the effect of no notice, parties attempting to gain control of a cor-
poration through stock acquisition will have to begin their efforts more
than sixty days prior to the stockholder's meeting, and the stock activity,
if noticed by the directors, may give them sufficient time to prepare a
defense.
7. CORPORATE POWERS: INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS;
INSURANCE; PARTNERSHIPS
Former Florida Statutes section 608.13(15) (1969), dealing with
the indemnification of directors, has now been made subsection (a) of
Florida Statutes section 608.13(14) (Supp. 1970). Section 608.13(14)
allows a corporation, unless otherwise provided by its certificate of in-
corporation or by laws, to indemnify any person made a party or threat-
ened to be made a party,26 to any suit threatened,2 7 pending or completed
action, suit, or proceeding under certain conditions. 28
In addition to indemnification, the corporation may advance funds
to the party involved to pay expenses in an actual proceeding, but not a
threatened proceeding, in advance of final disposition, provided the party
promises to repay the funds if he is ultimately found not to be entitled to
them under Florida Statutes section 608.13(14) . The indemnification
does not affect any other rights which the party may have and inures
to the benefit of his heirs, executors, or administrators. 0 Furthermore,
the corporation is expressly authorized to purchase and maintain insur-
ance covering any person for liability asserted against him and incurred
by him, regardless of whether or not he would be entitled to indemnifica-
tion under section 608.13(14)." However, it is doubtful whether any
insurance company would issue a policy that covered anything more
26. This provision was added to former Florida Statutes section 608.13(15) (1969),
which was also expanded to include administrative or investigative proceedings.
27. New provision.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14) (a) (Supp. 1970) (primarily that the person acted in
good faith, reasonably believing that his action would benefit the corporation).
29. See note 28 supra.
30. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(16) (Supp. 1970).
31. Caveat: all subsections of section 608.13 are expressly made subject to the state-
ment, "unless otherwise provided by law." FLA. STAT. § 608.13 (1969). The Securities and
Exchange Commission considers indemnification or insurance contracts void as against
public policy. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1971). In addition, at least one case, Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), has held an indemnity contract between
an issuer and an underwriter void. This case and others that probably will follow, when
considered with the declarations of the SEC, could vitiate the Indemnification policy of
the statute, as case and federal statutory law is presumably what Is meant by "unless
otherwise provided by law."
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than honest or reasonable errors.2 Finally, the provisions of section
608.13(14) are quite limited in allowing recovery, generally restricting
recovery to persons who act in good faith or with reasonable belief in the
correctness of their actions.
If there formerly had been any doubt as to whether a corporation
could enter into a general or a limited partnership, 3 it is now clear that
a corporation may do so.84 In addition, a corporation may enter into
joint ventures, syndicates, pools, associations, and other arrangements in
pursuance of the purposes set forth in the articles of incorporation as
long as the corporation would have had the power to do so alone.0 5
8. CAPITAL STOCK-PREFERRED
A prior statute0 stated that the shares of preferred or special
stock would
provide for dividends at such rates, on such conditions and pay-
able at such times and shall be subject to redemption rights at
such price or prices and at such time or times as shall be stated
and expressed with respect to such division by number and issu-
ance in series, dividends and redemption rights . . . 87
The new statute3 8 provides that the shares of preferred or special stock
shall
have such relative rights and preferences with regard to divi-
dend rates, redemption rights, conversion privileges, voting
power, and such other distinguishing characteristics as shall
be stated ...
This change appears to have no effect upon the substantive law, how-
ever.
9. MERGERS WITH FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
As urged in a prior survey,40 the Florida Legislature has amended
Florida Statutes section 608.21(1) (1969) to permit a Florida corpora-
tion to merge with a corporation organized under the laws "of any juris-
diction other than one of the United States," provided that "the laws
32. It is, of course, for the insurer and insured to determine the exact scope of
coverage within the limits (as expressed by public policy) of the law.
33. See Stein, Partnership Taxation for a Limited Partnership with a Corporate
General Partner-It Can Be Done, 25 U. Mra L. Rav. 435 (1971).
34. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(18) (Supp. 1970).
35. Id.
36. FLA. STAT. § 608.14(2) (1969).
37. Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 608.14(2) (Supp. 1970).
39. Id.
40. Sowards, Corporations, 1965-1967 Survey of Florida Law, 22 U. MIAMa L. REv.
339 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sowards].
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under which said other corporation or corporations are formed permit
such consolidation or merger.'
10. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Florida Statutes sections 907.03,42 908.03,11 and 909.08 (1969)" 4
have been repealed.4 However, all the essentials of section 907.03 may
be found in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 1.150(c);
former section 908.03 may be found in rule 1.170(d); and former sec-
tion 909.08, as it applies to corporations, may be found in rule 1.180(d).
Florida Statutes section 901.14 (1969) has been amended46 and is no
longer limited to proceedings before the magistrate who issued the
summons. Under the new law, the court which acquired jurisdiction by
issuance of a summons must enter a plea of not guilty if the corporation
does not appear and then must proceed to trial and judgment without
further process.
11. FEES
The amount of incorporating fees payable to the Department of
State, has been increased. For example, the fee to register a corporate
agent, payable under Florida Statutes section 48.091 (1969), has been
increased from one dollar to three dollars. Florida Statutes section
608.05 (1969), covering filing fees and taxes necessary for corporate
existence, has been extensively amended4 7 and the session laws should
be consulted to ascertain the correct fees. Florida Statutes section
608.37 (1969), dealing with the restoration of corporations dissolved
for failure to file reports and pay capital stock tax, has been amended to
increase the fee from ten to fifteen dollars.48
41. FLA. STAT. § 608.21(1) (Supp. 1970). As indicated in a prior survey (Sowards,
supra note 40), a problem of jurisdiction over the new corporation is created where the
corporation elects to treat the foreign country as the place of incorporation. The original
bill, S.B. 1490, which was filed in the Florida Legislature in 1967, provided that the new
corporation would be a Florida corporation. However, the current law makes no provision
for retention of jurisdiction. Thus, it is possible that the rights of the shareholders might
be jeopardized. See Sowards, supra note 40, at 341.
42. The statute provided for a summons to be issued when the defendant was a
corporation.
43. The statute provided, inter alia, that if the corporation failed to make an ap-
pearance, a plea of not guilty should be entered on the record.
44. The statute provided that a plea of guilty to a felony charge could be accepted on
behalf of a corporation even if it was not present at the proceeding.
45. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180.
46. FLA. STAT. § 901.14 (Supp. 1970).
47. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-114, § 10.
48. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-114, § 11. The practitioner should also check FLA. STAT.
§§ 609.02, 613.02, 617.11, 618.04 and 618.05 (1969), all of which are subject to the fee
increases provided by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-114.
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12. CORPORATE REGULATION-TAX
Florida Statutes section 608.311 (1969) 49 was created to define a
corporation to
include the following entities and all references to corporate
characteristics shall include corresponding or equivalent char-
acteristics of noncorporate business associations:
(1) Corporations, mutual insurers and other nonstock
business associations . . . ; and
(2) National banks, state banking and trust companies
and savings and loan associations.
If a party falls within this definition, "he"50 must file a corporate return
setting forth the required information. The corporate return is due on
the first day of January of the taxable year,"' although it is not delinquent
until the first day of May. Florida Statutes section 608.3211 covers the
taxable period from July 1, 1971, through December 31, 1971, and re-
quires the return to be filed on or before November 1, 1971; if an exten-
sion is requested prior to the due date, the department may provide an
extension of up to 105 days. 2 The amount of the corporate privilege tax
due shall be an amount equal to one dollar on each one thousand dollars
of the corporation's net worth in excess of fifty thousand dollars.'- A
minimum tax of 75 dollars is due from all corporations. 4 However, it
should be made clear that the tax imposed by Florida Statutes section
608.33 "5 is subject to the special rules provided in Florida Statutes section
608.333."6 Section 608.333 is designed to deal with corporations which
have not been incorporated or doing business within the year, 7 bank-
rupt or dissolved corporations, 8 and affiliated corporations. 9 The collec-
tion of the tax will be made under chapter 214,60 which is a new tax
administration act.
Foreign corporations are expressly subject to the privilege tax upon
49. As amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-359, § 1.
50. "He" includes foreign corporations authorized to do business in Florida and also
includes non-profit corporations. FLA. STAT. § 608.32(3) (1969), as amended by Fla. Laws
1971, ch. 71-359, § 2 and Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-979, § 2.
51. A calendar year for the corporate privilege tax, runs from January 1 to December
31 even though the information and values required shall be determined as of the close
of the corporation's annual accounting period immediately preceding the commencement
of the taxable period. FLA. STAT. § 608.322, created by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-359, § 5.
52. See note 51 supra. Valuation is the same as provided by Fla. Laws 1971, ch.
71-359, § 5, but is determined as of the close of the corporation's annual accounting period
immediately preceding July 1, 1971. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-359, § 6.
53. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-359, § 8. But see Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-979, § 2.
54. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-359, § 10.
55. Id. at § 7.
56. Id. at § 12.
57. Id. at § 12(1).
58. Id. at § 12(2).
59. Id. at § 12(3).
60. Id. at § 19.
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the issuance of a permit to transact business in this state. The payment
of the tax is a condition precedent to the issuance of the permit.,'
B. Recent Decisions
1. PRE-INCORPORATION AGREEMENTS
This topic concerns the rights and liabilities of the promoter, the
corporation which he promotes, and the third party with whom the pro-
moter has contracted to perform services for the proposed corporation.
In a recent case, 2 a promoter had entered into a contract with the plaintiff
who was to perform services for the corporation. After default, the plain-
tiff sued the promoter for payment. The promoter presented two de-
fenses to the court: 1) the contract was a contract of guarantee, and thus,
any claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds; and 2) the promoter's
liability was secondary, that of a guarantor. The court rejected both
arguments, holding that the contract was not barred by the Statute of
Frauds and that the liability of a promoter is primary unless the pro-
moter can show that the other party agreed to look only to the corpora-
tion to be formed for his recourse.
2. CORPORATE NAMES
Florida Statutes section 608.031 (Supp. 1970) provides that a "cor-
poration," prior to incorporation, may reserve its name. However, once
incorporated, no remedy is provided by Florida Statutes chapter 608
(1969) if another corporation should wish to use an identical name. Thus,
the right to the use of a corporate name is protected only by common law.
While there is a statutory remedy for trademark or trade name in-
fringement,' there is a distinction between this remedy and the common
law remedy for the protection of the corporate name. However, Florida
cases and most cases in other jurisdictions have proceeded from the
premise that the protection of the corporate name is really an aspect
of the law of unfair competition."
In Junior Food Stores v. Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 5 the respondent in-
corporated in June 1961 and registered its name first under Florida Statutes
chapter 495 (1959). It, as well as the petitioner, entered into a franchise
agreement with a chain store and as a result changed its name. While the
stores were not in competition initially, expansion brought them into
conflict in one area. The parties stipulated that the similarity of their
signs and trade names would cause confusion if used in the same loca-
61. FLA. STAT. § 613.02(1) (1969), as amended by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-359, § 18.
62. International Design, Inc. v. Rubin's Franchises, Inc., 247 So.2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1971).
63. See FLA. STAT. ch. 495 (1969).
64. See Note, Corporations: Right to Exclusive Use of Corporate Name, 28 CALM.
L. REv. 766 (1940).
65. 226 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1969).
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tion. The court held that the prior registration of the trade name and sign
design did not entitle the respondent to the exclusive use of the trade
name under chapter 495-since that chapter is concerned with trade-
marks and not trade names. However, the registration was effective since
it established the basis for the respondent's invocation of common law
trade name protection principles which are predicated upon a prior
"use"Y6) of a trade name as against subsequent use by another. The court
then considered the effect of the parties' stipulation and found that the
stipulation did not foreclose the petitioner from the right to operate
under a form of its corporate name because, at the time the petitioner
began operation, its business was far removed from the area served by
the respondent. However, under the common law, protection is only
extended to the first appropriator of a name within the territorial scope
of its business, against the subsequent use of the same or a similar name
by another. In the instant case, the stores were neighborhood conve-
nience stores. Because customers who are obliged to pay cash and carry
away their purchases will not patronize a store unless it is within their
immediate neighborhood, each store drew its trade from a small sur-
rounding territory. Although the chain stores formed one corporation, the
court held that each part of the chain must be considered separately.
Thus, even though the stores were within the same city, they were in
different neighborhoods, and therefore, did not operate within the ter-
ritorial scope of each other.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in First Guaranty Bank
and Trust Co. v. First Bank & Trust Co.,)7 utilized a different approach,
the consumer confusion test. Under this test, the party seeking relief must
show that because of the similarity of trade names, potential customers
of the first appropriator of the trade name are actually doing business
with the second appropriator under the mistaken impression that they
are doing business with the first. Evidence that there has been mis-
delivery of merchandise between the two stores is, however, insufficient
to sustain the burden of proof.
It is submitted that the territorial scope test would probably not
yield the same result as the consumer confusion test, since a bank gen-
erally does not draw its clientele from a limited area. Therefore, a court
could probably find an overlapping of territories, but not find "con-
sumer confusion."
3. SERVICE UPON A CORPORATION
In any litigation involving a corporate defendant, effective service
of process is essential to bind the corporation, and where applicable, its
officers, directors or stockholders. 8 Concern has always been mani-
66. Cf. Abner's Beef House Corp. v. Abner's Int'l Inc., 227 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1969).
67. 237 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
68. See generally FIA. STAT. ch. 48-49 (1969). See also Bayitch, Conflict of Laws,
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fested by corporations, which have appointed resident agents, over the
question of whether service upon the agent is binding service upon the
officers, directors or stockholders of the corporation. The District Court
of Appeal, First District, has held that service upon the corporate resi-
dent agent is not sufficient to create personal liability for the officers, di-
rectors or stockholders.' 9 Once a corporation has appointed a resident
agent, service upon that agent confers in personam jurisdiction over the
corporation upon the court, and a showing that the cause of action arose
out of the corporation's activities in Florida is not necessary.70 Where
service of process is attempted upon a corporation pursuant to Florida
Statutes section 48.081(1) (1969),71 Florida's general corporate service
of process provision has caused some confusion regarding the proper
person to be served and the sufficiency of the sheriff's return of service.
According to the statute, service must be attempted in descending order
starting with the president and finishing with any officer or business
agent 2 Service made upon a desk clerk pursuant to this statute was
held insufficient, despite the fact that the clerk delivered the material to
the president of the corporation, where no showing was made that the other
classes of officials enumerated by the statute were unavailable. 8 In
Ludlum Enterprises, Inc. v. Outdoor Media, Inc.,74 the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, stated that the statute had to be strictly con-
strued since its purpose is to insure notice, and that the absence of all
members of a superior class designated in the statute is a condition
precedent to the validity of service upon a member of an inferior class.
It is unclear to what lengths the sheriff in serving process must go to
determine whether, in fact, the members of the superior class are present
within the State of Florida. It is submitted that the sheriff's return, stat-
ing specifically that the inembers 5 of the superior class are absent, ac-
companied with an affidavit of diligent search,76 should be sufficient to
sustain the service of process.
The validity of service has been attacked on two occasions after
1969-1971 Survey of Florida Law, 26 U. MIAmi L. REv. 1, 62 (1972) for a review of the
cases concerning service of process on foreign corporations.
69. Meiselman v. McKnight, 226 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
70. Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortgage Co., 240 So.2d 879 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970). See also FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1969).
71. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(1) (1969):
Process against any private corporation, domestic or foreign, may be served: (a)
on the president or vice-president, or other head of the corporation; and in his
absence: (b) On the cashier, treasurer, secretary or general manager; and in the
absence of all of the above: (c) On any director; and in the absence of all of the
above: (d) On any officer or business agent residing in the state.
72. See also FLA. STAT. § 48.081(2)-(5) (1969).
73. Ludlum Enterprises, Inc. v. Outdoor Media, Inc., 250 So.2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971).
74. Id.
75. The return should quote the statute in listing the members.
76. See FLA. STAT. § 49.051 (1969).
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default judgment had been entered. In the first case,77 the sheriff's re-
turn showed service upon M. Krieger, resident agent, in the absence of
the president, vice-president, cashier, treasurer, secretary, general man-
ager, director, and all other officials. A default was granted and final
judgment entered on April 2, 1969. A motion to set aside the default and
judgment was filed on May 7, 1969, along with an affidavit of M. Krieger,
the vice-president and resident agent, stating that he had never been
served. Testimony was taken which showed that the sheriff had no
independent recollection of service. The court held, however, that
Krieger's uncorroborated testimony was not clear and convincing evi-
dence sufficient to impeach the sheriff's return. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, stated that before a judge can set aside a default,
the corporation must allege and prove excusable neglect of an officer or
agent. In the instant case, the corporation failed to meet its burden of
proof, and the default judgment entered against it was affirmed.7 8
In the second case,79 the motion to set aside the default was filed
more than one year after the entry of the judgment. The return of service
stated that service had been made on the manager in the absence of the
president and all other officers of the corporation. An amended return
was filed stating that service was made
in the absence of the President, Vice-President or other head
of the corporation, cashier, treasurer, secretary, general man-
ager, all the directors of said corporation, any officer and busi-
ness agent residing in this State, and by then and there showing
to him this original and explaining to him the contents
thereof.8°
The court refused to set aside the judgment, holding that it was only
voidable8' and not void since sufficient notice had been provided to the
corporation.
Thus, in service of process cases where the adequacy of service is
being attacked, the movant must show by clear, convincing and cor-
roborated testimony that the return of service is invalid. Furthermore,
where more than a year has passed since entry of the default, a heavier
burden is placed upon the party attempting to set aside the default. In
this situation, the movant must do more than impeach the sheriff's return.
77. Winky's, Inc. v. Francis, 229 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
78. Id. The dissenting judge felt that the default should be set aside since the record
was sufficient to impeach the sheriff's return of service. It does not appear from the case
whether the inconsistency in the sheriff's return was argued. The return stated that, in the
absence of the president, vice-president, etc., service was made upon the resident agent.
Since Krieger was the vice-president of the corporation, as well as the resident agent, the
return was inconsistent on its face.
79. Craven v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 226 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
80. Id. at 409.
81. Thus, it was within the one year time limitation imposed by FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.540(b).
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He must show that he did not receive sufficient notice of the pending
suit so as to violate his constitutional right of procedural due process.
4. CORPORATE VENUE
Venue is the privilege of the defendant to be sued in a particular
locale. 2 It is a personal privilege which cannot be waived by the action
of a co-defendant who has failed to assert his venue privilege.83 Venue
for corporations is governed primarily by Florida Statutes section
47.051 (1969). 84 In an action where there are two or more defendants,
Florida Statutes section 47.021 (1969) may apply." However,
in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Mercer,8s the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, held that section 47.021 is inapplicable when
all the defendants are mutual residents of the same county even though
one or more corporate co-defendants may also "reside" in other counties.
As could be anticipated, the greatest amount of litigation regarding
corporate venue dealt with the problem of where the cause of action
accrued. Where allegations of venue are affirmatively made in the com-
plaint, it is the defendant's burden to establish the absence of proper
venue." In B & F of Clearwater, Inc. v. Wesley Construction Co.,88 the
defendant was unable to meet his burden. The complaint, filed in Pinellas
County, asked for damages for breach of contract and quantum meruit
and alleged the defendant's repudiation of a contract for the construc-
tion and delivery of three building units to Dade County. There was also
an allegation that the defendant corporation resided in Dade County.
The court stated that the general rule was
[w]here a contract involves the payment of money and no
place of payment is expressly agreed on, it may be implied that
payment is to be made where the payee resides or has an estab-
lished place of business, and where payment under the contract
may be made. Where there is an express promise to pay, and no
place of payment is stipulated, the debtor should seek the credi-
tor unless otherwise provided or agreed. In such cases the cause
82. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 47 (1969).
83. Maloney v. Fleishaker, 238 So.2d 496 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
84. The statute provides:
Actions against corporations.-Actions against domestic corporations shall be
brought only in the county or district where such corporation has or usually keeps
an office for transaction of its customary business, or where the cause of action
accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. Actions against foreign
corporations doing business in this state shall be brought in a county or district
where such corporation has an agent or other representative, or where the cause
of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.
85. The statute provides:
Actions against defendants residing in different counties or distrlcts.-Actions
against two or more defendants residing in different counties or districts may be
brought in any county or district in which any defendant resides.
86. 226 $o.2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
87. B & F of Clearwater, Inc. v. Wesley Constr. Co., 237 So.2d 790 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
88. Id.
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of action accrues where the default occurred, though it be in the
county where the plaintiff resides, and the action may be main-
tained in such county for the defendant's breach. 9
In the case at bar, if the plaintiff had fully performed the contract and
then sued the defendant to recover the contract price, performance of the
contract by the defendant, that is, payment, would be due in Pinellas
County. The fact that the defendant repudiated the contract does not
alter this result since the gravamen of the complaint is not limited to re-
covery for lost profits.
While it is the defendant's burden to show that venue is improper,
if the plaintiff is to maintain his suit in a county other than the de-
fendant's residence, the complaint must allege facts which show that
venue is proper under Florida Statutes section 47.051 (1969).9° This re-
quirement was not met in James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber
Co.,91 where the complaint alleged facts which showed a breach of con-
tract whereby the defendant promised to pay the subcontractor and the
plaintiff-materialman jointly. The court said that the "critical determi-
nation in all these [contract] cases is where performance is called for by
the contract, not where its benefits are to be enjoyed."92 In the Knowles
case, the breach was not a failure to pay money owed by the defendant,
but a failure to aid the plaintiff in securing a debt owed by another.
Therefore, venue was proper at the principal offices of the defendant since
there were no facts from which it could have been assumed that venue
was proper at the site of construction.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in a per curiam opinion,
held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable in Florida '
and dismissed an action without prejudice on the authority of Adams v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R. 4
5. SEPARATE ENTITY PRIVILEGE
The separate entity privilege is the privilege of a corporation to be
treated as an entity apart from those who created it. This privilege is
generally the primary reason for incorporating since it affords the in-
corporators liability limited to the extent of their investment. However,
"when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons."95 The Florida courts have fol-
lowed this rule in three cases decided during the survey period.
89. Id. at 792.
90. James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 489.
93. Shaw v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 229 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
94. 224 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
95. United States v. Milwaukee Ref. Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wisc.
1905).
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In the first case, Plank v. Arban,96 the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, "pierced the corporate veil" to prevent possible fraud or
injustice. In Plank, the complaint alleged an oral agreement to pur-
chase and operate a drug store. A corporation was organized to consumate
the purchase with the two contracting parties having equal control and
ownership. The corporation was authorized to issue one thousand shares
of stock and accepted an assignment of the contract to purchase the drug
store from the plaintiff, who had obtained the contract with the approval
of the defendant. The defendant was issued 500 shares of stock, and the
plaintiff was given an option to purchase the other 500 shares. Once in
control, the defendant caused the corporation to authorize an additional
one thousand shares of which one hundred were sold to him. The plain-
tiff then attempted to exercise the option on the condition that his shares
would constitute 50 percent ownership, but was refused. The fourth
district held that the complaint stated a cause of action. In re-
sponse to the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's stock option
agreement had no provisions regarding 50 percent ownership, the court
noted that the corporation and the defendant were identical. Thus, it was
held that the stock option agreement with the corporation was only one
aspect of a larger oral contract between the plaintiff and defendant and
had to be treated as such.
In the two other cases, the court refused to pierce the corporate veil.
In Tel Service Co. v. General Capital Corp.7 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida held that the mere fact that a lender had the borrower incorporate in
order to charge a higher rate of interest was not sufficient to establish
that the loans were actually made to individuals." The court adopted the
rationale of a New Jersey decision based upon similar facts9 where the
court had refused to allow the borrower to assert the defense of usury in
a foreclosure action because: 1) the lender had a legitimate policy of
dealing only with corporations; 2) the borrower corporation had a) a
bank account, b) adopted corporate resolutions in connection with other
borrowers, c) paid taxes, etc., d) acted as a valid legal entity; and 3)
because the chief stockholder had capable legal advice before forming the
corporation and was a knowledgeable businessman. The New Jersey
court held for the lender despite the fact that the sole reason the lender
dealt only with corporations was to be able to charge a higher rate of
interest.
96. 241 So.2d 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
97. 227 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1969).
98. Cf. Gilbert v. Doris R. Corporation, 111 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959); Atlas
Subsidiaries of Florida, Inc. v. 0. & 0., Inc., 166 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). In both
cases, the corporate entities were disregarded due to findings that loans were made to
individuals and that the corporations were devices to evade the usury laws. The court in
Tel Service affirmed the rulings in those cases because the only difference lay in the ap-
plication of the principles to the facts of each case.
99. Monmouth Capital Corp. v. Homdel Village Shops, Inc., 92 N.J. Super. 480, 224
A.2d 35 (1966).
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Lastly, St. Petersburg Sheraton Corp. v. Stuart °" involved a merger
where a tort claimant attempted to sue the parent organization. The
parent, International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), entered into an
agreement with Sheraton America approximately one year after the
"accident." The agreement stated that ITT or its subsidiary was to
receive all stock of Sheraton America in exchange for a proportionate
amount of ITT stock (a triangular merger)."' An ITT subsidiary was
incorporated by three ITT officers. The transfer of assets was accom-
plished and ITT, in a report to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
reported a merger of Sheraton America with the ITT system. The court
first stated that the fact that ITT labeled the transaction a merger did
not necessarily make it a merger. The court also followed the general
rules that the ownership of all of the stock of one corporation by another
corporation does not destroy the legal identity of the subsidiary corpora-
tion, and that the legal identity of the subsidiary is not destroyed by the
fact that the stockholders or officers of both companies are identical.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs failed to prove sufficient control by
the parent corporation over the subsidiary to warrant a finding that it
was a mere instrumentality of the parent corporation. Therefore, although
its subsidiary was liable for the obligations of the dissolved corporation,
ITT was not since there had been no merger between ITT and the dis-
solved corporation.
6. DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND AGENTS
A number of cases have arisen during the survey period concerning
the sufficiency of affidavits made by corporate officers in support of, or
in contravention to, a motion for summary judgment. According to
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure rule 1.510(e), affidavits must be
made on personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be ad-
missible in evidence and affirmatively show that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. In the first of these cases,
P & T Electric Co., Inc. v. Spadea,'0 2 the president of the plaintiff cor-
poration stated that the facts in the affidavit were true to "his best knowl-
edge, information and belief." This affidavit was held insufficient to pre-
vent the entry of a summary judgment for the defendant. However, in
United Bonding Insurance Co. v. Dura-Stress Inc.,"° the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, held that an affidavit of a corporation's presi-
dent which lacked the language "made on personal knowledge," was
sufficient. The court stated that the directors of a corporation'04 are
100. 242 So.2d 185 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
101. The purpose of a triangular merger is to protect the parent company from any
hidden liabilities of the firm which it wishes to acquire.
102. 235 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1970). Accord, Hurricane Boats, Inc. v. Certified Ind. Fab.,
Inc., 246 So.2d 174 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
103. 243 So.2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
104. Under FLA. STAT. § 608.40 (1969), the president of a Florida corporation is re-
quired to be a director.
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chargeable with knowledge of corporate affairs since it is their duty by
proper diligence to keep informed of the facts which the corporate records
and books disclose. Thus, when a director of a corporation makes an
affidavit on behalf of the corporation, "it is not necessary that he should
state the sources of his knowledge, or information and belief . . . ,,05 as
such knowledge is presumed.
Consent was a key issue in an action against a president and secre-
tary of a corporation which had filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
A creditor of the corporation accepted a compromise and satisfaction
against the corporate maker and then brought an action against the presi-
dent and secretary who had cosigned the note. The court had to deter-
mine whether the co-maker was still liable on the note in the absence of
an express reservation by the creditor, after the compromise was effected
by the corporate debtor. The lower court entered summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
reversed, holding that the pleadings raised a question of fact as to con-
sent. The note in question, executed prior to the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code in Florida, was governed by the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law (UNIL). Under the UNIL, the release by the holder
of a promissory note of one of its co-makers does not release the other
co-maker where the release is granted at the request of or with the con-
sent of the other co-maker. Consent of the co-maker need not be ex-
pressed, but may be implied from the relationship and conduct of the
parties together with the facts and circumstances surrounding the release.
Thus, a question of fact as to consent is presented where the corporation's
president executes the note in dual capacities (both individually and on
behalf of the corporation) and is active in procuring the release of the
corporate debt.'
In Yarnall Warehouse & Transfer Inc. v. Three Ivory Brothers
Moving Co.,10 7 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reiterated
the general rule that a "court will not substitute its judgment for that of
corporate management, absent a clear showing of bad faith, discrimina-
tion or abuse of business judgment ... ,10 and upheld the action taken
by the board of directors.
A corporate defendant was requested pursuant to Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, rule 1.340, to answer interrogatories through its presi-
dent. The interrogatories were not answered, and the court issued an
order requiring the corporate defendant through its president to answer
them. The corporation's secretary, who answered the interrogatories in
109. United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Dura-Stress, Inc., 243 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1971).
106. Glidden Co. v. Zuckerman, 245 So.2d 639 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). See generally
Murray, Negotiable Instruments and Banking, 1969-1971 Survey of Florida Law, 26 U.
MiAxi L. RiEv. 72 (1972).
107. 226 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
108 Id. at 889 (emphasis by the court).
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full, stated that the corporation's president was unable to comply with
the court's order because he was incarcerated. The court then entered a
default judgment against the corporation because of its failure to comply
with the court's order. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, phrased the issues presented as:
[W]hether under this rule [Rule 1.340] the propounder of an
interrogatory served upon a corporate party has the right to
designate the specific officer or agent who must answer the in-
terrogatories. A corollary question is whether in cases where
interrogatories are served upon a corporate party under this
rule, the trial court may order such corporate party to answer
the interrogatories by an officer or agent designated by the pro-
pounder or by the court. °9
The Fourth District answered both questions in the negative. The court
found no basis for either the propounder or the court to require a specific
individual of a corporation to answer interrogatories. If the propounder
does seek to question a specific corporate officer, he may do so by oral
deposition."'
7. LIABILITY OF A CORPORATION FOR ACTIONS OF ITS
AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES
In McArthur Jersey Farm Dairy, Inc. v. Burke,"' an employee,
driving carelessly on the company premises, struck another person who
was performing work for the company." 2 The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held that
to impose liability it is necessary to show that: (a) the employee
is engaging in or shows a propensity to engage in conduct that
is in its nature dangerous to members of the general public;
(b) the employer has notice that the employee is acting or in
all probability will act in a manner dangerous to other persons;
(c) the employer has the ability to control the employee such
as to substantially reduce the probability of harm to other
persons; and (d) the other person must in fact have been in-
jured by an act of the employee which could reasonably have
been anticipated by the employer and which by exercising due
diligence and authority over the employee the employer might
reasonably have prevented."3
109. Ohio Realty Inv. Co. v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 244 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1971).
110. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.310(a).
111. 240 So.2d 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
112. The accident did not occur while the employee was within the scope of his em-
ployment. Recovery under the doctrine of respondeat superior was, therefore, not possible.
See Beckham & Chopin, Torts, 1969-1971 Survey of Florida Law, 26 U. MIAmi L. REv.
128, 133-34 (1972).
113. McArthur Jersey Farm Dairy, Inc. v. Burke, 240 So.2d 198, 201 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970).
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The interpretation placed on subsection (c) is the unusual aspect of the
decision. The court found that the superintendent of the company had
previously threatened to discharge the employee from his job unless he
ceased driving upon company premises. Further, the employee, a minor,
was subject to the control of his father, who was also an employee of the
company. Implicit in the finding of liability is the court's belief that the
company should have threatened both employees with the loss of their
jobs, and if necessary, fired both of them for the acts of the minor em-
ployee.
The question of corporate liability for the acts of its employees was
presented to the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Alford v.
Parker's Mechanical Constructor's, Inc."' In Alford, the employee, de-
spite the corporation's instructions to the contrary, took a company truck
after-hours for his own personal business. He obtained access to the
truck with his key, supplied to him by the corporation. The court found
that the employee took the vehicle from a locked area without the em-
ployer's knowledge or consent. Therefore, the corporate owner was not
liable for the damages arising out of the accident in which the corporate
vehicle and the employee were involved.
The question of control was litigated in McMillon v. Sinclair Refin-
ing Co.1 5 The plaintiff was injured by a truck labeled with the Sinclair
name and colors and which carried the Sinclair product. However, Sin-
clair neither owned the truck nor had any control over its type, size,
routes or schedules. The plaintiff was not allowed to recover from Sin-
clair since it had no control over the delivery of its products.
The right of the injured plaintiff to recover punitive damages from a
corporation was litigated in two cases during the survey period. In loab,
Inc. v. Thrall,"16 the employee committed an intentional tort in the course
of his employment. The jury returned a verdict of compensatory damages
against the employee and the corporation, but assessed punitive damages
against the corporation alone. The corporation argued that the plaintiff
must recover punitive damages against the agent in order to sustain an
award of punitive damages against the principal (the corporation). The
court rejected this argument.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in affirming a similar
award for punitive damages, avoided the contention of the corporate de-
fendant that it could not be held liable in punitive damages for the inten-
tional torts of its employees where it was not shown that the corporate
defendant was guilty of conduct which constituted a punishable offense." 7
The court, after stating that it did not agree with the question as framed,
found sufficient competent evidence in the record to sustain the jury ver-
114. 241 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
115. 236 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
116. 245 So.2d 291 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
117. Wackenhut Corp. v. Greene, 238 So.2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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dict since the jury could have found that the acts of the defendant's em-
ployees were committed in furtherance of the defendant-employer's busi-
ness or interest.
8. SHAREHOLDER'S RIGHTS
New shareholders of a corporation initiated a suit against the cor-
poration's former officers and directors for the return of a management
fee. These officers and directors were also the officers and directors of the
corporation to whom the management fee was paid. The court held that
where the prospective purchasers of a corporation have knowledge, prior
to the sale, of a fee to be paid to a corporation which has a directorate
similar to the purchased corporation, the purchasers may not thereafter
complain where the services billed were actually rendered.11
In a related area concerning the transfer of a right connected with
corporate ownership, the owners of an incorporated apartment complex
attempted to allow the tenants of the buildings to use the lake on which
the complex bordered. The lake bed was owned substantially by a home-
owner's association, composed of single family home owners bordering
the lake. The tenants of the complex "took over" the lake to almost the
virtual exclusion of the home owners. The association brought suit to
enjoin the tenants from using the lake surface. The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, was faced with the question of whether the cor-
poration, through its owners, could multiply its right to use the lake sur-
face by the number of tenants in the complex. The court held that it
could not, stating that only the owners of the land lying under the lake
may use all of the surface waters of the lake. The court reasoned that
this was a reasonable classification which treated all owners equally;
there was, therefore, no denial of equal protection. The remedy of injunc-
tion was necessary in order for the association to preserve its right to
beneficial use of its property.119
9. PROHIBITED TRANSFERS BY A CORPORATION
Florida Statutes sections 608.30, 608.54, and 608.55 (1969) are
designed to prevent a corporation, by transfers in dissolution or otherwise,
from escaping liability for its lawful debts and obligations. During the
survey period, several cases involving prohibited transfers by corpora-
tions interpreted these sections. In the first case,x20 a corporation sold its
motel to another corporation. Subsequent to the sale, the seller corpora-
tion dissolved, selling its assets and "assigning" a purchase money mort-
118. Riviera Cond. Apts., Inc. v. Weinberger, 231 So.2d 850 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
119. Silver Blue Lake Apts., Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Ass'n, Inc., 225 So.2d
557 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). Query: could the corporation circumvent the effect of this
decision by issuing shares in the corporation to the tenants of the building, and thus make
each tenant an "owner" of the corporation?
120. Godshall v. Hessen, 227 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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gage to the stockholders of the dissolved corporation. The plaintiff ob-
tained a judgment against the dissolved corporation, but execution was
returned unsatisfied. The present suit was begun by the plaintiff judgment
creditor to discover the assets of the dissolved corporation. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, found that the judgment had become
final prior to the transfer of the second mortgage (which was received
from the purchaser corporation in the sale of the motel) by the seller
corporation to its stockholders. Therefore, the transfer was invalid, and
the purchaser corporation was ordered to apply the second mortgage
payments to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's judgment.
In the second case,' 2 ' the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
stated in a brief opinion that the record was sufficient to show a prohib-
ited transfer by the corporation to its officers and directors in violation of
Florida Statutes section 608.55 (1969), which subjects the transferees to
personal liability 22 to the corporate creditors.
In the final case, 23 the plaintiff sold stock to the defendant, but re-
tained the stock certificates as collateral to secure the payment of the
purchase price. Once in control, the defendant sold the corporation to a
realty company which dissolved the corporation. Obviously, the effect of
the dissolution was to render worthless the stock held by the plaintiff as
collateral. The plaintiff instituted suit to either collect the entire purchase
price, or obtain substitute collateral. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that until there was a default in the payment, there could
be no relief. The court reasoned that there was no destruction of the col-
lateral at the time the action was brought. In addition, the court stated
that the assets of a dissolved corporation are deemed by law to exist for
the benefit of creditors for a period of three years.'24 The court also found
that the plaintiff had legal rights of recovery under a guarantee which
had been executed by the purchasers of the stock.
10. DISSOLUTION AND RESTORATION
When a corporation fails to pay its capital stock tax within six
months of the due date, the corporation will not be permitted to maintain
or defend an action in any court in this state until such taxes are paid.'25
If a domestic corporation fails to pay the tax for a period of one year,
then the corporation is subject to dissolution.1 6 In a case arising under
121. Felix Special Sausages, Inc. v. PBR Eng'rs & Associates, Inc., 231 So.2d 542 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1970).
122. The statute provides that liability is to the full extent of any loss such creditors
and stockholders may sustain by the statute's violation.
123. Berger v. Levin, 231 So.2d 875 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
124. See FLA. STAT. § 608.30(1) (1969).
125. See FLA. STAT. § 608.35(1) (1969), repealed by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-359, § 15.
But see Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-979, § 4, which prohibits a corporation from maintaining or
defending any action if it fails to pay the annual privilege tax, net income tax, or fails to
file its annual report.
126. See FLA. STAT. § 608.36(1) (1969). A foreign corporation's permit to do business
in this state will be cancelled for failure to pay the tax.
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the latter situation, a motion to dismiss was granted because the plaintiff
corporation had been dissolved due to failure to pay the stock tax. A
motion for rehearing and for reinstatement of the cause was filed, and a
telegram from the secretary of state was introduced to prove that the cor-
poration had been reinstated. 1"7 The motions were denied. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed, holding that where a complaint
has been dismissed due to the involuntary dissolution of the corporation
because of failure to pay taxes, a timely motion for rehearing and rein-
statement should be granted upon submission of proof to the trial judge
that the corporation has, in fact, been reinstated."2 8
11. RECEIVERSHIP
Receivership"29 is a judicially guided attempt to reorganize a corpo-
ration or business that is undergoing financial difficulties in an effort to
prevent bankruptcy. The receiver, as an officer of the court, is not subject
to suit for actions undertaken in that capacity in the absence of an
enabling statute. However, the court which appointed the receiver may
grant leave to a party to sue the receiver. When a receiver exceeds his
authority or acts in a personal capacity and not as a receiver, he cannot
claim the court's protection. Therefore, a receiver guilty of misfeasance
or negligence may be sued as an individual, and leave of court is not a
prerequisite to maintenance of the suit."'
In managing the affairs of a large business, the receiver will probably
find it necessary to utilize the services of attorneys, accountants, and such
other specialists as the exigencies of the particular business may demand.
Consequently, upon completion of his services the question of payment
arises. It is clear that the receiver is entitled to fees from the corporation
for his work and costs, when his work has benefited the receivership
estate. Following this rationale, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, permitted the recovery of attorney's and accountant's fees in
Johnson v. Kruglak."'
12. USURY-LOANS TO CORPORATIONS 1
2
Two cases have arisen during the survey period interpreting Florida
Statutes sections 687.071 (1969) (criminal usury), and 687.11 (1969)
(interest rates). In Fields v. Wilensky,' suit was initiated against a
guarantor who raised the affirmative defense of usury. At the time the
note was executed, Florida Statutes section 687.07 (1963)1" provided
127. See FLA. STAT. § 608.37(1) (1969).
128. Prestress Erectors, Inc. v. James Talcott, Inc., 235 So.2d 739 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
129. See generally FLA. STAT. chs. 56, 69 (1969).
130. Murtha v. Steijskal, 232 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
131. 246 So.2d 617 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
132. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 687 (1969).
133. 247 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
134. Repealed by Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-135, § 2.
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that both principal and interest on a usurious loan would be forfeited.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that Florida Statutes
section 687.11 (19 69 ) 111 repealed the conflicting provisions of section
687.07 by implication. Furthermore, those provisions of section 687.11
which conflicted with section 687.071136 were also impliedly repealed.
Therefore,
insofar as transactions involving an interest rate in excess of
twenty-five percent the provisions of section 687.071(7) render
any debt thereunder unenforceable both as to principal and
interest; however, insofar as any transaction where the interest
as to individuals is in excess of ten percent but not more than
twenty-five percent and as to corporations is in excess of fifteen
percent but not more than twenty-five percent, only the interest
is forfeited and the principal of such debt is recoverable in the
courts of this state.3 7
The court held that retroactive application of section 687.071 presented no
problem since retroactive application of certain civil remedies was permis-
sible. 3 '
13. STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE ACTION
A stockholder's derivative action is an action brought by a stock-
holder who is attempting to enforce a right that belongs to the corpora-
tion, but which the corporation refuses to enforce. It is for this reason
that the courts have held that it is improper for a complaint to contain
separate counts where both the plaintiff's individual right and the corpo-
ration's right to recover are pleaded.139 It follows that if one claim is
settled, the settlement would not have a res judicata effect upon the other
claim. 40 However, the defense of res judicata may be available if it
clearly appears that the claim could have been brought with a previously
litigated action. 4'
In Brown v. Epstein,4 2 the plaintiff recovered damages in a stock-
holder's derivative action. The court also awarded, $4500 in attorney's
fees and $1200 in accountant's fees. The plaintiff's motion to tax the fees
135. Created by Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-299, § 2.
136. Created by Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-135, § 2.
137. Fields v. Wilensky, 247 So.2d 477, 482 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
138. Id. But see Staros v. Avalon Shores, Inc., 249 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971),
where it was held that the penal provisions enacted in Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-135, § 1, do
not apply retroactively to loans made prior to that date.
139. See Karnegis v. Lazzo, 243 So.2d 642 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), where the court dis-
missed the complaint for misjoinder, without prejudice to the plaintiff to file a separate
action on the cause of action not included in the amended complaint. See also General
Dynamics Corp. v. Hewitt, 225 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
140. Horowitz v. United Investors Corp., 227 So.2d 719 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
141. Id. The action which was settled was brought in New York, and the court does
not indicate whether New York law would have permitted the joinder of the two claims.
142. 227 So.2d 245 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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as costs to the defendant was granted in toto for the accountant's fees and
in part for the attorney's fees. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, reversed the trial court's award, holding that under Florida
Statutes section 608.131(5) (1969), the expenses of maintaining the
action including the awarded fees were to be paid out of the fund recov-
ered by the plaintiff for the benefit of the corporation and are not prop-
erly taxable as costs.
14. RECOVERY OF CORPORATE STOCK
In an action involving extensive litigation, the plaintiff recovered a
judgment which called for the transfer of stock to his name. The defen-
dant posted two supersedeas bonds and appealed the decision of the trial
court. The defendant's appeal was unsuccessful, and the trial court's
judgment was affirmed. In the time that elapsed because of the appeal,
the stock depreciated approximately $25,000 in value. The plaintiff then
filed a motion to assess damages on the supersedeas bonds. The trial court
awarded the plaintiff damages in the full amount of the depreciation.
The trial court's entry of judgment against the surety was appealed by
the principal. 43 Both supersedeas bonds contained a clause which pro-
vided that the principal would pay "damages for delay, use, detention and
depreciation of any property involved in the event said appeal is dis-
missed or the said judgment or order is affirmed.. ."'" if the principal
failed to do so. Where a supersedeas bond is involved, Florida Appellate
Rule 5.9 governs the conditions of the bond. According to that rule, "the
elements to be considered in fixing the amount and conditions of the bond
shall be the cost of the action ... , damages for delay, use, detention, and
depreciation of any property involved."" The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that the decline in the market value of the stock was
a type of depreciation of property contemplated by Florida Appellate
Rule 5.9. Since the plaintiff was deprived of ownership of the stock while
the defendant appealed, the defendant and his surety were liable for the
economic loss occasioned by the declining market value of the stock.
15. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
The effect of registering stock certificates in joint names was litigated
in Sullivan v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.' 6 The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that registering the stock in the
names of both the son and the mother who purchased the stock created a
presumption of a gift from the mother to the son. However, if the pre-
sumption was rebutted, proof of the other essential elements of a gift
would be necessary to sustain the validity of the gift.
143. Price v. Rome, 237 So.2d 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 836.
146. 230 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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In Bernstein v. Coats,'47 the defendant corporation counterclaimed
for malicious prosecution, seeking both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. The trial judge's instruction to the jury that embarrassment was not
a proper element of damages for a corporation was contested on appeal.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, agreed with the trial court
and affirmed the judgment.
The Florida Supreme Court, answering a query posed by the gov-
ernor, stated that section five of article VII of the 1968 Constitution pro-
hibits a corporate income tax. However, the recently-enacted constitu-
tional amendment in Florida, which was necessitated in large part
because of this opinion, has mooted this problem. 48
II. SECURITIES REGULATION
A. New Legislation
1. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE
Pursuant to the notes contained in the 1969 Florida Statutes, Florida
Statutes section 517.02 (9) has been officially amended to read: " 'Depart-
ment' shall mean the department of banking and finance." 4 9 Under the
new governmental reorganization, this department will now dispose of all
matters previously handled by the Florida Securities Commission. In
addition, Florida Statutes section 517.03 (1969) has been amended 5
to authorize the department to make all rules and regulations necessary
for the proper administration and enforcement of the securities law.' 5'
2. EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS
Florida Statutes section 517.06 (1969) has been substantially broad-
ened by recent amendments. 5, Prior to amendment, section 517.06(10)
granted an exemption from registration of securities of a corporation
trust or partnership, if the subscriptions for such securities did not exceed
25 (and if other requirements of the statute were also met). However,
this exemption was limited to corporations, trusts or partnerships orga-
nized under Florida law. Under the new amendment, 5 ' the requirement
that the corporation be "organized under the laws of this state" has been
147. 247 So.2d 725 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
148. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1971). FLA. CONST.
art. VII, § 5 provides:
No tax upon estates or inheritances or upon the income of residents or citizens of
the state shall be levied by the state, or under its authority....
But see the new constitutional amendment which permits a corporate profits tax. H.J.
Res. 7-B, 1971 Sess., Fla. Legislature. See also Florida Income Tax Code, Fla. Laws 1971,
ch. 71-984.
149. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-377, § 195.
150. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-377, § 196.
151. Id. The remainder of FLA. STAT. § 517.03 (1969), dealing with the composition of
the Securities Commission, has been repealed due to the governmental reorganization.
152. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 1.
153. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 1.
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deleted, and any proposed corporation, trust or partnership, domestic or
foreign, may qualify for this exemption. The exemption was previously
conditioned by the requirement that no commission, compensation, or
remuneration be "paid or given for or in connection with the sale or dis-
position of such securities." Remuneration may now be paid to those ob-
taining subscriptions. However, the statute limits the potential benefi-
ciaries to dealers and salesmen registered under Florida Statutes section
517.17 (1969). 154
Section 517.06(16) (1969) has also undergone major alteration. An
exemption can now be obtained by an issuer for his securities if he has
filed a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1" and if the regis-
tration statement is effective at the time of the sale."'
3. REGISTRATION BY COORDINATION
Florida Statutes section 517.08 (1969), providing for registration
by notification, has been repealed. 57 The section which replaces former
section 517.08 provides for registration by coordination.'58 The new
section provides that securities which meet certain qualifications shall be
entitled to be registered for sale in Florida by coordination. The major
requirements to be so registered are: 1) a registration statement filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of
1933; 1 9 2) an offering supported by a firm committment,' 60 or the secu-
rities being registered are offered in exchange for the securities of another
issuer; 3) an issuer in continuous business operation for at least three
years; 4) no default by the issuer in the payment of any fixed obligation
or dividends during the current year and the past two years; 5) the
issuer's earnings, net of tax effect, equal or exceed one hundred thousand
dollars, not including extraordinary items, for the current and past two
years; and 6) no material alteration in the earning capacity of the busi-
ness.11
154. See J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUsIsss PROMOTIONS 21-22
(1971).
155. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78(1)(g) (1970).
156. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 1.
157. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 2.
158. Id.
159. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
160. Under the firm commitment method the underwriter, promising to purchase all
the shares being offered, acts as a principal buying for his own account. Under the "best
efforts" approach, the underwriter, using his best efforts to sell the stock, acts as an agent
for the issuer, and therefore, is not liable for any unsold shares. A third method is the
Y2, Y4, Y4, etc., or none agreement, where the underwriter places the funds derived from
the sale of the shares in an escrow account until the specified percentage of stock is sold. If
the specified percentage is not sold, the purchaser's money is returned, and the underwriter
is not liable for any unsold shares. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 159-73 (2d ed.
1961).
161. See generally J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON Naw BUSINESS PROMOTIONS
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Mo~sxy].
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If the issuer determines that he qualifies under the above require-
ments, he then files a registration statement.0 2 The registration statement
must contain the information required by Florida Statute section 517.08
(2).1"' The Florida registration statement then becomes effective con-
currently with the federal registration statement, provided the registrant
has submitted the required additional information 4 to the Department
of Banking and Finance at least one business day before the effective date
of the registration statements. If the registrant fails to comply with any
or all of the requirements, the Department may enter a stop order without
notice or hearing and retroactively deny effect to the registration state-
ment.1 5
4. REGISTRATION BY QUALIFICATION
Florida Statutes section 517.09 (1969), providing for registration
by qualification, was amended 6' to avoid any inconsistency with Florida
Statutes section 517.08 (1969), which now provides for registration by co-
ordination. For example, section 517.09(1) was amended to state "regis-
tration by coordination" rather than "registration by notification," which
was the procedure provided by former section 517.08. Additionally, sec-
tion 517.09(5), providing for compensation for the sale of securities
registered by qualification, was amended to permit the Department of
Banking and Finance to fix the maximum discounts, commissions, ex-
penses, remuneration and other compensation to be paid for or in con-
nection with the sale or offering for sale of any security in this state.'67
5. REGISTRATION BY ANNOUNCEMENT
Florida Statutes section 517.09(1) (1969) provides that any secu-
rities which have been outstanding and in the hands of the public for not
less than one year may be registered by announcement. The intent of the
statute has been preserved, though a number of changes have been made.
The statute now requires a dealer to file, in addition to the informa-
tion that he had to file under the old statute, the name and address of
each officer, trustee or partner of the issuer; a brief description of the
162. The statement must be filed at least five days prior to the effective date of the
federal registration statement. However, the Department has the authority to waive the
time requirement. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 2, amending FLA. STAT. § 517.08(3)(d)
(1969). A filing fee of one-tenth of one percent of the aggregate sales price of the se-
curities is due upon filing, but the fee shall be not less than twenty nor more than one
thousand dollars. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(6) (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 2.
163. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(2) (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 2.
164. FLA. STAT. § 517.08(5) (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 2, requires
that the registrant inform the Department of Banking and Finance of all expenses incurred
due to the registration, of the maximum offering price, and of all discounts or commissions.
This provision may be waived by the Department.
165. See generally MoFsKY, supra note 161, at ch. VII.
166. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 3. No substantial changes were made to the statute.
167. See MorsK', supra note 161, at ch. VII.
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business of the issuer; the name and address of each person owning ten
percent or more of the securities being registered; a description of all of
the issuer's authorized and outstanding securities; the name and address
of the transfer agent, a description of the circumstance by which the
securities came into the hands of the public, and a copy of the issuer's
financial statement.
168
The registration is effective for one hundred twenty days after the
end of the issuer's fiscal year in which the registration becomes effective.
However, the registration may be "renewed" by the submission of a new
application in accordance with the requirements of section 517.091.
One addition has been made to the list of persons for whom secu-
rities registered by announcement may not be sold, a controlling per-
son.'69 The addition was apparently made to close a possible loophole in
this statute which prevents registration by announcement for any secu-
rities to be sold directly or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer.
6. CONSENT TO SERVICE
Florida Statutes section 517.10 (1969), providing for consent to ser-
vice of process, has been amended to avoid conflict with the statutes
dealing with registration.' Now, any issuer not domiciled in Florida,
who registers by coordination, qualification or announcement, must file a
consent to service of process for any suits arising under Florida Statutes
chapter 517 (1969).
7. REGISTRATION-DEALERS AND SALESMEN
Under Florida law, any person wishing to be a dealer or salesman of
securities must register with the Department of Banking and Finance,
and the registration must be renewed annually."" However, if an applica-
tion for registration is granted on or after November first, the registra-
tion is effective for the ensuing calendar year. Previously, Florida Stat-
utes section 517.12 (1969) provided for a reduced fee for those dealers
who registered with the commission after July first. With the addition of
the November first provision, however, this fee reduction was repealed. 2
The dealers registered under section 517.12 must maintain such
books and records as the department may prescribe, and the department
has the authority to examine such records.Y3 The dealer must post a
bond concurrently with his registration, and the form of the bond has
168. FLA. STAT. § 517.091 (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 4.
169. Although the statute is silent as to the definition of a "controlling person," it
may be assumed that a control person under Florida law is the same as a control person
under the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77(n)
(1970); Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAWYER 559 (1966).
170. FLA. STAT. § 517.10 (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 5.
171. FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 6.
172. FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (6) (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 6.
173. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 6, adding FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (9).
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been modified to accommodate any registrations which are granted on or
after November first. 74
8. PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF CHAPTER 517
In conjunction with the revision of the penalty provisions,'175 Florida
Statutes section 517.302 (1969) 176 now provides that any person who vio-
lates any of the provisions of the Florida Securities laws is guilty of a
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in recently-enacted
Florida Statutes sections 775.082, 775.083,178 or 775.084."'
B. Recent Decisions
1. WHAT IS A SECURITY?
In Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori,18 ° the appellant sold
sewing machines and cookware for substantially below the nationally ad-
vertised price. The purchaser of the sewing machine or cookware became
a "founder" eligible to earn sixty dollars upon recruitment of each subse-
quent founder. When there were three thousand founders, or less if the
appellant deemed practicable, a discount store would be opened. The
funds to build the store were supplied from money paid in by the founders
who, thereafter, would earn commissions on sales to the people whose
names were supplied by each founder. Each founder was to supply the
names of one hundred families. The discount store was to be operated in
accordance with the market plan formulated by the corporation, and each
founder would either make a monthly payment to cover the overhead
expenses of the store, or suffer a reduction in his commission on sales.
The stock of the corporation selling the sewing machines or the cookware
was privately held and was not involved in any way with the "deal."
The trial court held that the merchandising plan was a "security",
and restrained the appellant from further sales under the plan. On appeal,
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed.'' On certiorari to
review the district court's opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed 8 2 and adopted the decision of the district court as being in accord-
ance with the public policy of protection for investors. 8
174. FLA. STAT. § 517.13 (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96, § 7.
175. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136.
176. As amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, § 488.
177. Created by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, § 2 (a term of imprisonment in the state
penitentiary not exceeding five years).
178. Created by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, § 2 (a fine in lieu of, or in addition to,
any punishment described in FLA. STAT. § 775.082, up to five thousand dollars).
179. Created by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, § 2. This is the enhanced punishment
statute, which provides a term not to exceed ten years for a felon subsequently convicted
of a third degree felony.
180. 232 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1970).
181. Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So.2d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
182. Id., 232 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1970).
183. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1969).
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The purpose of the founders was found to be profit both from the
commissions on obtaining other founders and from the commissions on
the sales from the store to be opened. The supreme court found that this
arrangement was thus directed toward the possibility of gain, and quot-
ing the district court's opinion,' held that the founder's contracts
constituted an " 'interest in or under a profit-sharing or participation
agreement or scheme' within the meaning of Florida Statutes § 517.02
(1) . . .185
2. PURCHASER'S ACTION TO RECOVER THE PURCHASE PRICE OF STOCK
In Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 6 the plaintiff's second cause
of action was for the recovery of the purchase price of securities which
the plaintiff alleged were sold in violation of state securities laws. Upon
defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the trial court and held that
a complaint for recovery of the purchase price of stock is sufficient where
it alleges: 1) the existence of the contract of sale; 2) that the profit to be
made by a distributor lies not in the sale of a product, but in the securing
of other distributors; 3) that the contracts were securities which were not
restricted, in violation of Florida Statutes chapter 517; 4) that the con-
tracts were not within any exemption provided by chapter 517 for the
sale of securities; and 5) that such sale was in violation of the provisions
of the securities law.
In Florida Peach Corp. v. Barron,"7 the witness in an affidavit,
asserted that at the time he purchased the stock he was a bona fide resi-
dent of Florida. However, at trial, the witness asserted by affidavit that
he was a bona fide resident of Ohio at the time of purchase. The plaintiff
had claimed that the association whose shares she purchased was not
entitled to an exemption because all of the association's stockholders
were not bona fide legal residents of Florida.18 As proof of her conten-
tion that all the shareholders were not Florida residents, she offered the
witness' affidavit. The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that
the trial court should have stricken the affidavit, holding that a witness
184. The dissenting judge argued that the contracts did not constitute a security, citing
Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So.2d 841 (1968). The
corporation in Gallion appears to be the Alabama counterpart of the Florida corporation
involved in this litigation, as the contracts used by the Alabama corporation are almost
identical to the contracts used by the Florida corporation. Florida Discount Centers, Inc.
v. Antinori, 226 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
185. Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 232 So.2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1970).
186. 246 So.2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). A recent article indicates that the SEC is
contemplating action against Koscot. Miami Herald, Jan. 7, 1972, at 8C, col. 3.
187. 249 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
188. The association claimed an exemption under FLA. STAT. § 517.05(10) (1967)
which grants an exemption to an agricultural co-operative, all of whose shareholders are
residents of Florida. The requirement of Florida residence was stricken by FLA. STAT.
§ 517.05(10) (1969).
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cannot induce an action of another party by representing one set of facts
and subsequently refute such facts by the execution of a contrary affi-
davit." 9
In Dokken v. Minnesota-Ohio Oil Corp.,"'9 another action to recover
the purchase price of securities, the defendants were able to claim an ex-
emption for an isolated sale on the ground that they were not issuers."'
The trial court found that the plaintiff entered into the agreement with
the president of the defendant corporation to purchase an interest in an oil
lease. At the time the agreement was made, the interest purchased by the
plaintiff was neither owned by the defendant corporation nor by its presi-
dent. Likewise, neither of them controlled or developed the lease. The
corporation accomplished the transfer of the interest to the plaintiff at no
profit for itself or for the corporation's president.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Dokken, found
that both the defendants and the plaintiff were minority interest holders
in a producing oil well, and that the defendants had no greater control
over the operation than did the plaintiff.192 The court also noted that the
defendants were in the business of selling oil leases, but not in Florida.
The court held that under these facts the defendants were not issuers
because the defendants lacked control over the enterprise. 9 ' Furthermore,
the court did not take into account the business activities of the defen-
dants outside of the State of Florida, holding that it was immaterial in
determining whether the sale of a security in Florida was an isolated
sale. With this evidence excluded from consideration, there was no evi-
dence that the sale to the plaintiff was part of a general plan or purpose
or that it was a sale by persons in the business of making sales in Florida
in violation of the securities laws. Therefore, the defendants were entitled
to an exemption.
3. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
In Economic Research Analysts, Inc. v. Brennan,' the appellee
worked as a salesman for Economic Research Analysts, Inc., a dealer in
securities. The employment agreement provided that Brennan would not
work for any other dealer in the south Florida area for a period of six
months after the termination of the agreement. The agreement expressly
provided that the relationship of employer-employee did not exist. Bren-
189. The court also indicated that the absence of the word, "legal", from the affidavit
of residency is not a fatal deficiency since the terms, bona fide resident and legal resident,
are equivalent.
190. 232 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
191. See FLA. STAT. § 517.06(3) (1969).
192. Dokken v. Minnesota-Ohio Oil Corp., 232 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). The
Florida cases cited by the court do not deal with situations where the sale is voidable;
rather they hold that an instruction on estoppel is erroneous where the sale is void.
193. Id. at 203.
194. 232 So.2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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nan was registered with the Florida Securities Commission as a registered
agent or salesman for Economic Research. Economic Research was re-
quired by statute"9 5 to supervise Brennan's conduct, and any sales of
securities made by Brennan were to be made through the company who
paid commissions to him. Brennan could not sell securities for another
dealer without the express permission of the dealer under whose name he
was registered. The court upheld the agreement not to compete, holding
that the defendant was an agent of the plaintiff.'96 Therefore, the agree-
ment to restrain Brennan from carrying on or engaging in a similar busi-
ness within a limited time and area was valid since it came within the
exception provided by Florida Statutes section 542.12(2) (1967).'
An action was brought in circuit court against a stockbroker alleging
fraud, etc., in a transaction where the plaintiff was sold stock on margin.
The margin agreement provided that the contract was to be governed by
New York law and that any controversy was to be settled by arbitration.
The circuit court refused to stay court proceedings pending the outcome
of arbitration, and an appeal was taken. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that the policy of the Florida Securities Law' 9" was
paramount to the Florida Arbitration Code. 99 The court held further that
arbitration of the issues of alleged fraud, misrepresentation, and breach
of fiduciary duties was not consistent with policy and language of Florida
Securities Law.10
In Easton v. State,201 a six count indictment was returned against
the defendant. Three counts alleged the unlawful sale of securities, while
three others alleged that the defendant unlawfully engaged in business as
a dealer in securities without being registered. The defendant was con-
victed, and the trial court entered sentences on each count. On appeal,
however, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed, holding
that where an indictment contains more than one count, and each count
is a facet or phase of the same transaction, only one sentence may be
imposed.
195. FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1969).
196. Economic Research Analysts, Inc. v. Brennan, 232 So.2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
197. The statute is still in effect. FLA. STAT. ch. 542 (1969) deals with combinations
restricting trade or commerce.
198. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1969).
199. FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1969).
200. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc. v. Vouis, 247 So.2d 733 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The
court failed to discuss the conflicts of law problem, and there is no indication why the
court applied Florida law instead of the lex voluntatis, New York law. See generally,
Bayitch, Conflicts of Law, 1969-1971 Survey of Florida Law, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1
(1972).
201. 250 So.2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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